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ABSTRACT
In this Letter we examine the Multiverse theory and how it relates to the Anthropic Principle.
Under the supposition of Eternal Inflation, the String Theory Landscape (STL) has reinvigorated the
discussion of the Anthropic Principle. The main premise being that the fundamental constants of our
Universe are not necessarily of any fundamental physical importance, rather that the specific values
are requisite for intelligent life to arise, and hence, for intelligent life to measure such constants. STL
predicts a multitude of other meta-stable Universes with fundamental constants different than our
own, possibly hinting at some intrinsic specialness of human life. We develop a theoretical framework
to prove whether, (1) the Universe we observe must be consistent with the existence of observers, (2)
the principle is only ontological in nature, or (3) if the Anthropic Principle itself is simply a tautology.
Subject headings: Anthropic Principle: Relativity — Inflation — Lemaˆıtre F ractals — Observations
— Ontological Laws — Supersymmetry
1. INTRODUCTION
Is there a peculiar specialness to our Universe with
regard to the existence of intelligent life? Philosophers
have long pondered whether or not the Universe is “fine
tuned” to accomodate such conscious beings. This is,
in the most general sense, what is known as The An-
thropic Principle. It can be considered in direct contra-
diction to the Copernican Principle (or the Cosmological
Principle) that postulates that man does not occupy a
privileged position in the Universe (under this princi-
ple, if we observe that the Universe is isotropic then it
can be easily shown that the Universe is homogeneous).
More specifically, the Earth is not the center of the Uni-
verse, and therefore, by definition, you are not the cen-
ter of the Universe. This can also be extended to the
Mediocrity Principle which argues that there is nothing
unique about the Earth or even us as humans (see Zaius
1968). Furthermore, it has also been frequently proposed
(e.g., Descartes) that the Anthropic Principle is a circu-
lar (or tautological) argument, and, in addition, since
all other Universes in the Multiverse are inaccesible to
us, this discussion is therefore meaningless. Until re-
cently, most physicists would most likely shy away from
addressing the Anthropic Principle in any scientific body
of work. However, recent cosmological unravellings have
made this subject unavoidable. Thus, the fundamental
question to then pursue is: do we observe the Universe
as it is simply because only observers like ourselves exist
in such a Universe?
Despite precision measurements from the Cosmic Mi-
crowave Background and large scale structure (LSS) con-
firming the homogeneity of the Universe, the Anthropic
Principle is not necessarily invalidated. A consequence of
both String Theory and Cosmic Inflation (more specif-
ically, Eternal Inflation) is the existence of an infinite
number of possible Universes. Given this “Multiverse”
scenario, we can redefine the problem. It may be plau-
sible to assume that the fundamental constants need to
have almost the exact values they do to give rise to life
as we know it. Furthermore, cosmological paramaters,
like Ω, need to be tuned to incredibly high precision to
result in a Universe that is not too “diluted” or too “over-
weight”. However, the Multiverse implies that these con-
stants will be different for every “pocket universe”. In
this paper, we form, from first principles, mathematical
relations that attempt to infer the probability that we as
humans matter in the Multiverse.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In the following sections we lay out our theoretical
framework for calculating whether or not we are of any
significance in a seemingly void, indifferent, and deso-
late Universe(s). We note that we do not subdivide our
investigation to consider more specific versions of the An-
thropic Principle, like the Weak1 and Strong versions.
The Conditional Relations for the Anthropic Princi-
ple model (Model 1) assumes the favored concordance
ΛCDM paradigm, simplified predictions from The String
Theory Landscape (STL), and assumptions about the
Multiverse from Eternal Inflation to calculate the like-
lihood that we matter, which is not at all arrogant en-
deavor. We now lay out a simple theoretical approach
to estimate the magnitude of the importantness of our
intelligent species.
We first take a standard envelope and turn it over. We
then start to write down math on the back of it that
we think relates to probabilistic arguments relevant to
the Anthropic Principle. We will assume that there are
∼ 10200 meta-stable Universes comprising the Multiverse
allowed by STL2. Let us also assume that the fundamen-
tal constants in each of these ∼ 10200 Universes are dif-
ferent from ours, though their vacuum energy densities
may be somewhat similar. Thus, life may certainly exist
in this multitude of Universes, but we argue that it will
not be remotely like ours (see Figure 1). We also now
know, to great accuracy, that our Universe is ∼ 6000
1 We strongly advise not using the word “weak” when coming
up with a Principle.
2 This may or may not have been “borrowed” from a recent talk
by Alan Guth.
2Fig. 1.— Cartoon schematic of the Multiverse. We inhabit one
of a multitude of meta-stable Universes. Eternal inflation predicts
that these “pocket universes” will have fundamental constants dif-
ferent than ours. Hence, though there may be other forms of life,
we do not expect them to remotely resemble the intelligent life in
our own Universe. Image is to scale.
years old (±13.7 billion years), and let us take the up-
per limit. Since humans have been around ∼ 5999 360365
years, this requires that the current epoch is really the
only time that mankind could have existed.
Mathematically, the probability that humans exist (de-
noted as m), and therefore may matter, is :
m = 10−200 × 10−10 = 10−210 (1)
This remarkably small value of m lends creedence to the
fact that we may not be wholly irrelevant.
The Conditional Relations for the Anthropic Princi-
ple Proposed In the Extended Regime model (Model 2)
pushes this argument even further. This new regime is
one in which we take knowledge of the specialness of hu-
mankind and follow that semi-cogent path to uncover the
specialness of you. We know that m is of order 10−210,
and now we fold in the probability that throughout all
of humanity, you were created. We start by adding the
simplified conjecture that every, and only, G-type stars
have Earth-like planets that harbor human life (∼ 1010
in our own galaxy), and that there are some ∼ 1010 MW-
ish galaxies in our Universe. Armed with the knowledge
that humans have been around ∼ 5999 360365 years (see the
previous section for the detailed calculation), let us pos-
tulate that over this time span there have been roughly
1010 human beings. Your parents were 2 of these 1010,
and there are∼ 4.2817×1022 genetically different zygotes
for every couple. We define a new parameter ǫ with these
considerations in mind,
ǫ =
( 1
1020
)
×
( 2
1010
)
×
( 1
4.2817× 1022
)
, (2)
What unfolds is quite remarkable, yet completely uncon-
trived. Close examination of Eq. 2 reveals that,
ǫ = 4.6709× 10−53 (3)
ǫ =
1.8439× 10−55
4π2
, (4)
which is just 42 times the Planck constant squared di-
vided by 4π2:
ǫ = 42×
h2
4π2
= 42~2, (5)
Therefore, in units of ~−2,
ǫ = 42. (6)
It may also be worth considering the interesting pos-
sibility that ǫ could evolve with time, making you even
more special in the past (see Scherrer 2009). Of course,
we need to combine ǫ and m to attempt to quantify your
significance, thus we introduce the parameter u. There
are surely other possibilities that could be considered,
and we just add these as higher order terms O (naturally
the uncertainties in the assumed WMAP5 parameters
are encompassed by O). In other words,
u = ǫ×m+O, (7)
(again, in units of ~−2). The higher order terms can be
set as an upper limit, thus we can re-write Eq. 7, which
now says that,
u ≤ mǫ, QED. (8)
Our theoretical argument certaintly bolsters the An-
thropic Principle. Specifically, the models imply that
we as self-aware beings are special in the Multiverse,
and possibly more importantly, that you are important,
though ≤ mǫ.
3. THE ACRONYM CLEVERNESS - NUMBER OF
CITATIONS RELATION
While our rigorous mathematical proof in §2 appears
infallible, Fig. 2 mandates that we proceed with caution,
and that only time will tell how our theory holds up. In
this figure we project where this paper will fall on the
AC-NC diagram.
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Fig. 2.— AC-NC diagram. We project where this paper will
lie on the AC-NC relation. Solid band represents some sort of
subjectiveness. Regardless of robustness, the weaker acronym for
Model 1 has the potential to make our paper less relevant. We also
show an anonymous colleague’s model for comparison. See §2 for
acronyms and details.
3By standard convention, we investigate the power of
our acronyms by making use of the Great Ramification
Evaluator of Acronyms Tester (Jennings & Rutter 2011)
– a modified version of the WU¨RST test (Knack & Bier
1956). Since AC ∝ NC2, Model 1 has the potential to
drive down the number of citations, and cause the pa-
per (and hence our conjectures) to lose credibility. In
fact, the previously published paper of the Probabilistic
Evoking Of Non-essentiallity model (a colleague’s model,
not ours) actually uses our exact proof, essentially in re-
verse, to show that all of this conspiring actually proves
that we are incredibly insignificant in what they dub
“the grand scheme of things”. Despite being far supe-
rior to our models and strongly suggesting our total lack
of importance, their poor choice of acronym causes them
to have an incredibly low citation count rendering their
theory irrelevant. Some3 have argued that the AC−NC
relation may be violated. To address this concern, in
a forthcoming paper (Watson 2011, In Prep.) we de-
velop the Conditional Relations for the Anthropic Prin-
ciple for Probabilistic Informatic Extreme Set Theory
model, which actually is only an acronym (a particularly
clever one, and replete with big words) and should po-
tentially receive no citations, hence, violating the laws
of Figure 2. Some concrete examples of the power
of the AC-NC relation include BOSS (Eisenstein et al.
2011) and SHAM (Conroy et al. 2006). However, pos-
sible serious violations to consider are 2D-FRUTTI
(Hesser et al. 1988) and PROSAC (Jørgensen et al.
2007) (see also; Bouvier et al. 1993; Jaffe et al. 1999;
Miller et al. 2000; Corbett et al. 2001; Stern et al. 2002;
Keating et al. 2003; Hill & Rawlings 2003; Seo et al.
2004; Beacom & Vagins 2004; Schenke et al. 2009;
McBride 2011).
We conclude that time will tell whether or not you
matter, however further consideration of the blatant cir-
cularity of this entire argument needs to be investigated,
which has the potential to render this entire paper ipso
facto meaningless.
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